State of Utah v. Mario H. Christensen and Rintha G. Christensen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1962
State of Utah v. Mario H. Christensen and Rintha
G. Christensen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Robert S. Campbell, Jr.; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Christensen, No. 9544 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3917
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
r ! ! 
STATE OF UTAH, by and thro~·gh I ·._.. 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
vs. Case No. 
MARION H. CHRISTENSEN and 
RINTHA G. CHRISTENSEN, his 
wife, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
9544 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys fo'r Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -····-···-···········--····-·-···-------- 1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT --·- 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ···········-···········-···-·······-·······-········-·····---·-····-··-· 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -···-·················-··--···················---·--·--···· 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ···········································-··-···········--· 9 
ARGUMENT ·····-··········-··--------·-··········------·~·········-·-····-····---···-··--·· 10 
POINT I. STATEMENTS MADE BY THE LAND-
OWNER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, DURING THEIR VIEW OF THE 
CONDE~INED PREMISES, WERE PREJU-
DICIAL AND INFLAMMATORY AND PRE-
VENTED THE STATE OF UTAH FROM 
OBTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
TRIAL -·-···················-··-·······-·······-·-·······················-····-·········-················ 10 
POINT II. QUESTIONS ASKED BY COUNSEL 
FOR RESPONDENTS ON CROSS-EXAM-
INATION OF WILBUR HARDING, WITH 
RESPECT TO SEVERANCE DAMAGE 
PAID BY THE ,STATE OF UTAH TO AN-
OTHER LANDOvV.NER ALONG THE SAME 
HIGHWAY PROJECT, WERE PREJUDI-
CIAL AND INFLA:NIMATORY, AND THE 
STATE OF UTAH WAS THEREBY DENIED 
A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL ........................ 15 
(A) The lower court committed pr.ejudicial 
error in overruling the ini.tial objection of 
the State of Utah ------··-··········-··········--··-···--·······----·-·····----- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
(B) S~tch questions ~vere asked in bad faith and 
their prejudicial effect was not cured ······-··- 21 
POINT III. REFUSAL OF THE LOWER COTJRT 
TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE, ON BEHALF OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, RELATING TO 
ZONING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUB-
JECT PROPERTY AT OR ABOUT THE 
DATE OF CONDEMNATION, WAS PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR -·········-·········-··········--·---·-····-·--·-········---· 24 
POINT IV. INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT WAS AN IN-
CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
AND CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR -···-····-····-···-·--·-··--·······-·-···--······----·--·--·--··------- 26 
CONCLUSION ·····-------···-··········-····--···-····-···--·-----·--·--·-------·- 30 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
39 Am. J ur. 80, New Trial, Sec. 65 -·-·----·-·-··-·-···-···------·· 22 
88 C. J. S. 212, Trial, Sec. 101 ··-·---··--·····--······-··-···-·--····-·-···- 26 
88 C. J. S. 329, Trial, Sec. 162(b) -···-··--···-··-·····-----· 24 
4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 255, Sec. 13.3 ··········--·- 29 
5 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 293, Sec. 21.33 ···--------- 17 
1 Wigmore on the Law of Evidence, 3rd Ed., 425, 
Sec. 34 ·····-·················-··········-··-·--····--····-·······-··-·-·---·-··---· 26 
CASES CITED 
Addy v. Ste,vart, 207 P. 2d 498 (Ida. 1949) -·········------ 27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
Alesko v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 62 Ida. 235, 109 P. 
2d 87 4 ··--····-··-····-····-··--·-·----·-------········-···--------·----------- 14 
Application of Court of New York Authority, et al., 
28 N. J. Super. 575, 101 A. 2d 368 -----------------------· 16 
Bancroft Realty Co. v. Alencewicz, 7 N. J. Super. 
105, 7 2 A. 2d 3 60 ---·-·-·········-·--·-·········-·-·-··-····-·------------------ 12 
Bragg v. C. E. Whitten Transfer Co., 125 W. Va. 
722, 26 S. E. 2d 217 ---------------·------------------------ 20 
City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal. 2d 509, 170 P. 
2d 928 ( 1946) -···-··-------------------------------------- 17 
City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. App. 2d 348, 
210 p. 2d 717 ( 1949) ------------------···-···------------------- 28 
Cook County v. Draper, 387 Ill. 149, 56 N. E. 2d 410 17 
Dantzler v. Mississippi State Highway Comm., 190 
Miss. 137, 199 So. 367 -···-···-·····-···------------------------- 17 
Dempsey-Vanderbilt Hotel v. Huisman, 153 Fla. 800, 
15 So. 2d 903 ·················-·····-····-····-········--···-·-·····-········--·-··------ 12 
Dusevich v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 260 Wis. 
641, 51 N. W. 2d 732 -············-·······-···-·--··-··········-··-······-···-···· 12 
Entzminger v. Seigler, 186 S. C. 194, 195 S. E. 244 
( 1938) --·······-···········-···············-··-·-·····--··-···········-······-········-···----20, 24 
Johns v. Shinall, 103 Colo. 381, 86 P. 2d 605 ( 1939) ... 23 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 
s. w. 352 ---····-·· ------·····------·-····-·-----·-··-- 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
Malie, et al. v. Seeley, 89 U. 262, 57 P. 2d 357 (1936) 26 
Mantonya v. Bratlie, et al., 33 Cal. 2d 120, 199 P. 2d 
677 ( 1948) ······----···-··--····--···-----------····-··--···-.... ---·--······· 28 
McCrae v. McCoy, 214 S. C. 343, 52 S. E. 2d 403 --·· 23 
Meecham v. Allen, 1 U. 2d 285, 262 P. 2d 285 (1953) 27 
Mehr v. Child, et al., 90 U. 348, 61 P. 2d 624 (1936)... 28 
P. A. Sorenson Co. v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 49 U. 
548, 164 P. 1020 (1917) -····-··--·------------------ 12 
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 104 U. 9, 137 P. 
2d 374 (1943) -···-·-····-/ ------------------------· 12 
Riddle v. State Highway Comm. of Kansas, 184 Kan. 
603, 339 P. 2d 301 (1959) _ ---- 12 
Schnider v. State of California, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 
p 0 2d 1 ( 1952) -·-•-·----·--••••• I 28 
So. Pacific Ry. Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 
2d 693 ( 1960) -····-···----·--·-·····-····-·------------·- 16 
State through its Engineering Comm. v. p,eek, 1 U. 
2d 263, 265 p. 2d 630 ( 1953) -···-·····-··--·-------·--··· 16 
State v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957) - 29 
State Highway Dept. v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 
2d 783 ( 1954) ····-·····-··--·----·-··--····--····-···--··--·--···-·-· 28" 
State Highway Dept. v. Calkins, 50 Wash. 2d 716, 
314 P. 2d 449 (1957) -············-------····-···--···-····--·----····- 28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
State Road Conun. v. Rozzelle, 101 U. 464, 120 P. 2d 
27 6 ·····--···-········------····-···---·--··········-····-·········-·--~···-·············--··--···-- --··· 29 
Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N. D. 708, 193 N. W. 312 _____ 23 
Townsend v. State of Wis., 257 Wis. 329, 43 N. W. 
2d 458 ·····---·--·--··············-··················---·-··········-·········--···-···-·····--·-·-······· 12 
U. S. v. 13,255.53 Acres, 158 F. 2d 874, C. A. 3rd 
( 1946 ) --····-····-·----·····----·-···-····--·····-···-···-···········-··-·-····--····-·-·--···--··-·· 17 
Valenti v. Mayer, 301 Mich. 551, 4 N. W. 2d 5 ····-····-····· 12 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Moore, 
2 u. 2d 254, 272 p. 2d 17 6 ( 1954) ···-·-···-·······-·········--- 12 
Weber County v. Ritchie, 98 U. 272, 96 P. 2d 744 
( 1939) ·····-----···········-······--·····--···-···············--····-···----···-------17' 18 
Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 S. E. 441 (1938) 13 
STA:TUTES CITED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 (j) ------········-··· 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
.Appellant, 
vs. 
MARION H. CHRISTENSEN and 
RINTHA G. CHRISTENSEN, his 
wife, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
9544 
The above entitled case is brought before this Court 
for its consideration by an appeal of th·e State of Utah, 
acting through its Road Commission, from the judgment 
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and order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for Utah County. The case was initiated by the State 
of Utah, under its inherent power of eminent domain to 
acquire property of the respondents for the construction 
of a state highway facility in Utah County. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Joseph E. Nelson presiding, on the 8th day of March, 
1961, entered judgment against the State of Utah and 
in favor of the respondents in the sum of $5,500.00, as 
compensation. The State of Utah on March 17, 1961, 
moved the lower court for a remittitur of the verdict 
and, in the alternative, a new trial; the said court, on 
May 15th, 1961, denied both motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
It is submitted, by this appeal, that the judgment 
of the District Court should be reversed and the case 
remanded for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACT.S 
On January 18, 1960, the State Road Commission 
of Utah filed a complaint in the Fourth District Court 
for Utah County to acquire, by eminent domain pro .. 
cesses, real property o'vned by the respondents herein, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Marion H. Christensen and Rintha G. Christensen, his 
"·ife, said property being situated in An1erican Fork 
City, and being more particularly described in the com-
plaint as Parcel No. 15-6:272:A (R. 3). An answer was 
filed (R. 14) by the respondents on October 13, 1960, 
thereby setting the case at issue for trial. The questions 
relative to jurisdiction, public use and necessity, and 
the right to condemn were admitted by the respondents 
(R. 14), and the only issue before the court was the 
amount of compensation to be paid to the respondents 
for the acquisition of their property interests (R. 17). 
On l\larch 6, 1961, the issues were joined and a trial had, 
before a jury of eight, with respect to (1) the fair mar-
ket value of the land acquired and (2) the damages ac-
cruing to the remaining property of respondents, caused 
by the severanc€l of the portion expropriated and the con-
struction of the public improvement in the manner pro-
posed (R. 75). On March 8, 1961, the jury returned its 
verdict against the State of Utah and in favor of the 
respondents in the following amounts: 
( 1) The value of the 0.54 acre of land as 
of January 18, 1960 ·················-·············-····----------·$1,080.00 
(2) Severance damages ································-··········-···· 4,420.00 
TOTAL VERDICT ·····························-------------------$5,500.00 
(R. 75.) 
The total tract of the respondents, prior to the ex-
propriation, constituted 1.10 acres ( Tr. 9), of which 
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0.54 acre was acquired by the State of Utah for the 
highway facility (Tr. 9). 
After the jury was empaneled and opening argu-
ments presented by counsel, the jury was permitted to 
view the premises acquired by the appellant and the 
Christensen land remaining (Tr. 15, Line 20). Among 
those present at the time the jury viewed the premises 
were the Christensens, their attorneys, the bailiff and 
deputy sheriff, and attorneys for the State of Utah (R. 
83). During the course of the jury view, Rintha G. Chris-
tensen, one of the respondents, addressed the jury orally 
and informed them that" it was difficult to see the prop-
erty being taken by the State of Utah (the highway being 
at that time partially constructed) and the remaining 
property (R. 83); further, that the jury could not get 
an entire picture of the sheep operation that the respon-
dents conducted and that it was much prettier in the 
springtime when the ''cute'' little lambs were in the pas-
ture area (R. 84). Mr. Aldrich, Special Assistant to the 
Attorney General, one of the attorney.s for the State of 
Utah, informed Mrs. Christensen that the law did not 
permit the jury to be addressed by the landowner during 
the view-
''to which Mrs. Christensen replied in context-
how was the jury to realize the extent to whieh 
she and her husband had been hurt if she didn't 
explain to the jury what they had before the high-
way was constructed and what they had there-
after.'' 
(R. 84.) 
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Thereafter, ~lrs. Christensen attempted to answer a 
question asked by an individual juror and Mr. Aldrich 
again informed her that only the bailiff should respond 
to the question (R. 84). 
At the trial of the matter, after the respondents 
had rested their case in chief, the State of Utah called 
Wilbur Harding of American Fork to testify ( Tr. 165). 
After being qualified, Mr. Harding testified that the 
value of the 0.54 acre being acquired by the State of 
Utah was $1,080.00 (Tr. 178, Line 17), that severance 
damage was $420.00 (Tr. 178, Line 24), and that total 
compensation approximated $1,500.00 (Tr. 179, Line 1). 
The value of the land expropriated by the State of Utah 
was based upon a computation of $2,000 per acre (Tr. 
180, Line 6), the highest and best use being residential 
(Tr. 172, Line 15). The opinion of Mr. Harding, in con-
nection with the value of the land actually taken was 
identical to that of the three witnesses who appeared in 
behalf of the respondents-Denzil A. Brown (Tr. 57), 
Milton Harrison (Tr. 90, Line 17), and Afton Payne 
(Tr. 122, Line 14). 
On cross examination, J. Rulon Morgan, attorney 
for respondents, asked Mr. Harding if it were not true 
that the owner of property, immediately to the west of 
Christensens, had been paid severance damage of 
$3,500.00 by the State, due to proximity of the new high-
way (Tr. 200). The lower court allowed the witness to 
answer, over objection, whereupon Mr. Harding an-
S\Yered he did not know (Tr. 200). Thereafter, counsel 
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for respondents continued his inquiry into the amount 
of severance damage paid in the amicable settlement with 
the property owner on the West. Specifically, the tran-
script reveals that the following examination was con-
ducted: 
MR. MORGAN: 
'' Q. This is going to be a six-lane freeway, 
is it not~ 
"A. That's right. 
'' Q. Has there been any traffic on this high-
way so far, other than construction equipment, 
so far as you know~ 
"A N . 
. o, s1r. 
"Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Harding, that the 
estate right next to this property line just to the 
west, that there was a severance of $3500.00 paid 
to that o·wn-er because of proximity of this high-
~vay? 
"MR. ALDRICH: Your Honor, what has 
been paid or what might be paid in some other 
case has1 no /bearing in this case, and it's im-
proper. 
"The COURT: I'll let him ans,Yer. Go 
ahead. 
''THE 'VITNESS: A. I don't know. 
BY !!R. MORGAN: 
''Q. Have you inquired to the west, as to 
how tnuch they got for proximity of the highu,ay 
to their home? 
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"MR. ALDRICH: I have a continuing ob-
jection to all of this line of testimony, because this 
is highly prejudicial. 
"TIIE COURT: You may. The objection 
is sustained. You 1nay proceed. 
BY MR. MORGAN: 
'' Q. Did you app1·aise the p1·operty on the 
west that I have referred to? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. For the State? 
''A. I did. 
'' Q. What was your appraisal to the prop-
erty on the west¥ 
1\tiR. CAMPBELL: We are going to object 
to this line of testimony. 
''THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. ~fORGAN: 
'' Q. Was there any severance damage to 
this property to the west~'' 
(Tr. 200-201. Empasis added.) 
It was the testimony of the respondents, during their 
case in chief, that the subject property, as of the date 
of condemnation, was zoned so that the sheep operation 
conducted on the property of the respondents constituted 
a non-conforming use (Tr. 46, L. 18) (Tr. 110, L. 29) 
(Tr. 136). 
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During the presentation of its case, the State of 
Utah attempted to adduce testimony from its witnesses 
that the zoning ordinances of American Fork City, at 
the date of condemnation, did not prohibit the use of 
respondents' property for a sheep operation, but that 
between the date of condemnation and the date of trial, 
the ordinances of American Fork City were altered, 
modified, and thereafter specified that the utilization of 
respondents' property as a sheep operation was a non-
conforming use (Tr.174-175; Tr. 222, Line 12). An offer 
of proof was made by the State of Utah (Tr. 176, Line 
1). The court sustained an objection to the admissibility 
of testimony concerning the ordinances (Tr. 176, Line 
9; Tr. 222, Line 15). 
The court, in its Instruction No. 7 to the jury, di-
rected that it might consider severance damage to the 
remaining land. The court then suggested several items 
which, in its opinion, constituted severance damage, such 
as irregular or inconvenient shape of the remaining land, 
cutting off access to a highway, annoyances from noise, 
vibrations, dust, odors, obstruction of view, and lessened 
value of the remainder as a site for the purposes for 
which the land "ras being used (R. 61). The jury was 
further directed that it should take into consideration 
the use of the re1naining land of respondents for pastur-
ing, protection of sheep and for shearing and lan1bing, 
in connection "Ti th the owners' sheep business operation 
(R. 61). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
STATEMENTS l\1ADE BY THE LAND-
OWNER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, DURING THEIR VIEW OF THE 
CONDEMNED PREMISES, WERE PREJU-
DICIAL AND INF,LAMMATORY AND PRE-
VENTED THE STATE OF UTAH FROM OB-
TAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
TRIAL. 
POINT II 
QUESTIONS ASKED BY COUNSEL FOR 
RESPONDENTS ON CROSS- EXAMINA-
TION OF WILBUR HARDING, WITH RE-
SPECT TO SEVERANCE DAMAGE PAID 
BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANOTHER 
LANDOWNER ALONG· THE SAME HIGH-
WAY PROJECT, WERE PREJUDICIAL 
AND INFLAMMATORY, AND THE STATE 
OF UTAH WAS THEREBY DENIED A 
FAIR AND IMP ARTIAIJ TRIAL. 
(A) The lower court committed prejudicial error 
in overruling the ~initial objection of the Stat~e 
of Utah. 
(B) S'ltch questions were asked vn bad faith and 
their prejudicial effect was not cured. 
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POINT III 
REFUSAL OF THE LOWER COURT TO 
RECEIVE EVIDENCE, ON BEHALF OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, RELATING TO 
ZONING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUB-
JECT PROPERTY AT OR ABOUT THE 
DATE OF CONDEMNATION, vVAS PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR. 
POINT IV 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT vv,.AS AN INCORRECT 
·STATEMENT O:F' THE LAW AND CONSTI-
TUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATEMENTS ~1ADE BY THE LAND-
OWNER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, DURING THEIR VIE\V. OF THE 
CONDEMNED PREMISES, ''TERE PREJU-
DICIAL AND INFLA~Ll\LA.TORY AND PRE-
VENTED THE STATE OF UTAH FROl\I OB-
TAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
TRIAL. 
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The affidavit of Glen E. Faxon (R. 83) evidences 
the fact that during the time the jury 'vas permitted to 
see and vie\\' the premises involved, one of the landown-
ers, Rintha G. Christensen, \\·as present and addressed 
the jury at large, relative to the difficulty in apprais-
ing the gravity of the conditions caused by the high-
way development. This conduct upon the part of the 
respondents is in direct transgression with the rule 
of this Court and the case law in the United States. 
Rule 47(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets out the 
conditions and agendum under which the jury view shall 
be conducted: 
'' \Vhen in the opinion of the court it is proper 
for the jury to have a view of the property which 
is the subject of litigation, or of the place in 
which any material fact occurred, it may order 
them to be conducted in a body under the charge 
of an officer to the place, which shall be shown 
to them by some person appointed by the court 
for that purpose. While the jury are thus absent 
no person other than the p.erson so appointed 
shall speak to them on any subject connected 1oith 
the t1~ial. '' (Emphasis added.) 
Not only were the statements made by Rintha Chris-
tensen connected to the substantive issues of the trial, 
but they 'vere directed to elements not compensable or 
cognizable under the rules of eminent domain. The as-
sertion of Mrs. Christensen impliedly indicated to the 
jurors that the sheep business and operation conducted 
by the landowners had been damaged by the expropria-
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tion of the State of Utah and signified that the opera-
tion, itself, was not as profitable as it had been prior to 
the construction of the highway facility. With respect 
thereto, the law is altogether clear that alleged loss of 
profits is not a compensable factor to be considered. 
Riddle v. State Highway Comm. of Kansas, 184 Kan. 
603, 339 P. 2d 301 (1959); Dusevich v. Wisconsin Power 
& Light Co., 260 Wis. 641, 51 N. W. 2d 732. 
The leading object of a jury view is to provide aid 
and assistance to the panel in order that the members 
might better apprehend the testimony elicited at the 
hearing. Weber Basi-n Water ·conservancy District v. 
Moo.re, 2 U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954). The view does 
not qualify as part of the evidentiary proceeding and 
may not be utilized by the panel as independent evidence 
in its deliberation. Redd v. Air~vay Motor Coach Lines, 
104 U. 9, 137 P. 2d 374 (1943); P. A. Sorenson Co. v. 
Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 49 U. 548, 164 P. 1020 (1917); 
Bancroft Realty Co. v. Alencewicz, 7 N. J. Super. 105, 
72 A. 2d 360; Tow~ end v. State of Wisconsin, 257 Wis. 
329, 43 N. W. 2d 458: Dempsey-Vanderbilt Hotel v. 
H~tisman, 153 Fla. 800, 15 So. 2d 903; v,..alenti v. Mayer, 
301 Mich. 551, 4 N. W. 2d 5. The statement of the re-
spondent was, therefore, improper by its very nature 
and made at a time when the jury was under the strict 
supervision and control of the bailiff (Tr. 15 ). 
It is correct to say that during the period when the 
jury visits the property, only the custodial officer or the 
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court, itself, should speak to the members, answer their 
questions, or point out physical features and character-
istics of the land. Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 
S. E. 441 (1938). The fact that Mr. Aldrich, attorney 
for the State of Utah, 'vas required to advise Mrs. Chris-
tensen to refrain from speaking with the jury ere a ted 
an undue and unjustified feeling of sympathy and emo-
tion in favor of the landowners. It could well have been 
reasoned by the members of the jury that it was enough 
that the State of Utah take the respondents' property 
involuntarily, without the additional fact of preventing 
Mrs. Christensen from making a statement with relation 
thereto. That Mr. Aldrich was obliged to admonish the 
landowner not to answer a question of a juror at the 
view, produced further seeds of sympathy in favor of 
the landowners and bias against the State of Utah. The 
authorities in this country sustain the rule that an im-
proper statement made by a party to a juror, during 
the course of the jury view, will serve as grounds for 
a new trial if such statement relates to a substantial 
issue in the case. In Yeary v. Holbrook, supra, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia said: 
''If the jurors, or any one of them, listen to 
a statement (not argument of counsel) of a per-
son made to them about a material matter in the 
trial of the case when such person is not on the 
witness stand, the conduct is improper, and \Vig-
more savs it violates the rule against hearsay. 
And, fu;ther, 'upon the same principle, the n1ak-
ing of statements by a witness at a view, or even 
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the pointing out of the places by a witness or 
other unauthorized person at a view (\vhich 
amounts to giving testimony) is a violation of 
the rule. 1-Iere, also, the only question can be 
\vhether the impropriety is, under the circum-
stances, sufficient ground for setting aside the 
verdict.' 3 Wigmore on Ev., sec. 1802 ( 2). '' 
(198 S. E. at 447.) 
The Idaho Supren1e Court, in commenting upon the 
appropriateness of parties attending the jury view and 
conversing with the jury, in Alesko v. Union Pacific 
Ry .. ·co., 62 Ida. 235, 109 P. 2d 874, said: 
''To obviate any such reoccurrence herein 
the vie'v should be had only in the company and 
presence of the attorneys, judge, and bailiff in 
charge of the jury. Any interested parties, par-
ticularly appellant or witnesses, should not he 
allo,x.red in the vicinity at the time of the vie"~, 
or to talk with the jury." 
In the case at bar, the re1narks of nirs. Christensen, 
as disclosed by the affidavit of n[r. Faxon, resulted in 
a plea of syn1pathy being ai1ued at the jury even before 
the respondents had opened thPir ca8e: her re1narks and 
retorts could not have been other,vise than prejudicial to 
the interests of the State of Utah, coupled 'vith the fact 
that they dealt 'vith elen1ents for 'vhich no recovery is 
allowed. The lando,vners should not have been 'vith the 
jury during the vie,\~ in the first instance. Their pres-
ence, standing alone, Inight not have been fa tal but the 
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conversation carried on \vith the jury constituted express 
prejudice, \Varranting reversal of the judgment. 
POINT II 
QUESTIONS ASKED BY COUNSEL FOR 
RESPONDENTS ON CROSS- EXAMINA-
TION OF WILBUR HARDING, WITH RE-
SPECT TO SEVERANCE DA~IAGE PAID 
BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANOTHER 
LANDOWNER ALONG THE SAME HIGH-
WAY PROJECT, WERE PREJUDICIAL 
AND INFLAMMATORY, AND THE STATE 
OF UTAH WAS THEREBY DENIED A 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
(A) The lower court committed prejudicial error 
in overruling the initial objection of the Stat~e 
of Utah. 
Testimony developed at the trial revealed little dif-
ference between the case of the respondents and that of 
the State of Utah with respect to the appraised value of 
the 0.54 acre required for the public improvement. The 
witnesses for the landowners appraised the land taken 
at $1,080. \'7ilbur Harding, expert for the State, evalu-
ated the tract expropriated at $1,080; Edwin Stein ap-
praised the tract at $620. The major issue under litiga-
tion centered about the quantum of damage attributed 
to the remaining land of the respondents brought about 
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by the condemnation of the 0.54 acre, 1. e., severance 
damage. 
It \Vas "·ith respect to an aspect of severance dam-
age (proximity of the highway facility to the remaining 
land) that a series of questions were asked of Mr. Hard-
ing on cross examination by defendants' counsel which 
branded the entire proceeding with an air of prejudice 
and prevented a fair hearing from taking place. Such 
examination had relation to the amount of severance 
damage paid by the State of Utah to a neighboring prop-
erty owner in settlement and the text of events is set 
forth in the Statement of Facts herein, page 6. In de-
termining the natural consequences of this line of ex-
amination, it is appropriate to consider the status of the 
la \Y \vith respect thereto. 
Testimony in connection \vith the sale of indepen-
dent but con1parable property is admissible in this juris-
diction as an indirect measure of the fair value of the 
property under consideration. So. Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State th'r'ough 
its Engineering Commission v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 
P. 2d 630 ( 1953). Ho"~ever, in order that a sale be eli-
gible for adn1issibility, it must be sho"rn that it was 
a roluntary one, i. e., transacted between a willing 
buyer and a w·illing seller. So. Pacific Ry~ Co. v. Arthur, 
supra; Application of Cou,·rt of Ne~v York Authority, 
et al., 28 N. J. Super. 575, 101 A. 2d 368. A sale that 
is n1ade under threat, co1npulsion, or in1pending litiga-
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tion does not partake of voluntariness and involves a 
buyer and/ or seller who is by implication, obligated to 
enter into the agreement. Thus, it is said, with some 
judicial unanimity of declaration, that a sale made be-
tween a landowner and a condemning authority may 
not be received in evidence in a proceeding wherein the 
condemnor seeks to acquire other lands. Weber County 
v. Ritchie, 98 U. 272, 96 P. 2d 744 '(1939); U. 8. v. 13,-
255.53 Acr~es, 158 F. 2d 87 4, C. A. 3rd, ( 1946) ; City o.f 
Los Angeles v. o·ole, 28 Cal. 2d 509, 170 P. 2d 928 (1946); 
Cook County v. Draper, 387 Ill. 149, 56 N. E. 2d 410; 
Dantzler v. 1llississippi State Highway Comm., 190 Miss. 
137, 199 So. 367. The reasons for the exclusion of a sale 
to a condemning authority is laid down by Nichols, Emi-
nent Domain, Vol. 5, page 293, Sec. 21.33. 
At the very outside, it might be apologetically ar-
gued that the questions directed to Mr. Harding by coun-
sel for respondents related to the sale of comparable 
property from a private landowner to the State of Utah 
-a statistic, itself, that requires its rejection. In point 
of fact, the inquiries were leveled at the amount of sev-
erance damage that the State of Utah had paid to the 
landowner, "\Vhose property abutted the Christensen tract 
on the \vest. By any standard, the questions w·ere im-
proper and the measure of any test would find the ex-
amination highly inflammatory and prejudicial to the 
public authority. It takes not an expert in land evalua-
tion to dra'v the rather basic conclusion that severity of 
severance damage on distinct parcels of property will 
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never be parallel. The impact of a public taking on re-
maining tracts is a variable factor, dependent upon the 
size of the condemned parcel, the size of the remaining 
tract, the best use of the property, the angle of taking, 
proximity of the public structure to private improve-
ments, and a host of other elements. Under what prin-
ciple of evidence were the series of questions propounded 
to the State's witness, Harding~ It is submitted that 
there is none, that the purpose of the examination was 
to embarrass the State of Utah and its witness and to 
allow the jury to infer therefrom. 
This Court in Weber County v. Ritchie, supra, read 
into the record its position concerning the admissibility 
of severance damage paid by the public authority to an-
other landowner : 
''Appellants (landowner) offered in evidence 
the testin1ony of another lando\\rner of the vicin-
ity. They sought to prove the value of the Ritchie 
land taken by proving \Yha t this other O\Yner had 
received from the County for his land for the 
san1e project. Ho\YPver, on voir dire it ,,~as dis-
closed that the sun1 of n1onev this lando"~er re-
ceived included damages to olhis remaining land. 
The court ruled out the testin1ony of this \Yitness 
upon the ground that it \Yas not proper evidence 
of value. Under the authorities \Ye think this \Yas 
correct. Although the decisions divide upon the 
question of admissibility of an1ounts paid by the 
conden1nor for other lands, there is little dis-
agreement that compro·Jnise settlements, including 
damages, are not ad1nissible. The proposed tes-
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timony did not segregate the sale price from the 
darnages. It is questionable whether the price, 
had it been segregated, would have been proper 
testimony under the definition of market value 
as applicable to condemnation proceedings. * * * '' 
( 96 P. 2d 7 44.) (Emphasis Ours.) 
The net result of this line of examination is several-
fold. 
(1) The jury is to assume that there is some valid-
ity attached to the question. It is presumed that the 
interrogatory, "Isn't it true, Mr. Harding * * * 
that there was a severance of $3,500 paid to that owner 
because of the proximity of this highway~'' propounded 
by counsel, was not a figment of the imagination. By 
line of succession, the succeeding presumption is that the 
State of Utah paid the neighboring landowner $3,500 for 
severance damage to his property but yet is only willing 
to pay the Christensens a sum less than $500. 
(2) Counsel for the State of Utah was placed on 
the horns of a dilemna, in that an objection could either 
be interposed to the line of questions, or in the alterna-
tive, counsel could remain silent. By raising an objec-
tion, the question of the cross examiner is given emphasis 
and attention; the logical interpretation by the jury 
from the objection made is that the State of Utah 
is concealing information and does not want it to be 
brought out. The objection, itself, inscribes the question 
asked, in the minds of the jurors. The remaining al-
ternative available to counsel for the State is, ipso facto, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
to remain silent and allow the question to come in with-
out an objection. This approach, of course, opens the 
door to a holocaust of irrelevant matter and is a poor 
substitute for obtaining a fair hearing under the estab-
lished rules of procedure. The State pursued the only 
realistic approach by way of objections, and it should 
not be subjected to a penalty of bearing the implications 
of such objections. 
(3) The witness, Harding, was unduly embarrassed 
and it would be inferred, by the layman, that the witness 
had not taken into consideration all the comparable sales 
of property in the vicinity of the condemned tract. It is 
improper to present to a witness a question which has 
no factual basis and to pursue further examination predi-
cated thereon. Bragg v. C. E. Whitten Transfer ·c·o., 125 
W.Va. 722, 26 S. E. 2d 217. 
In Ent~inger v. Se£gler, 186 S. C. 194, 195 S. E. 
244 (1938), a case wherein counsel for the defendant 
persisted in pursuing a line of questioning not only 
irrelevant but also prejudicial, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina cited the problem facing opposing coun-
sel: 
''It is plain that this testn11ony could in no 
'vay have enlightened the jury on any legitin1ate 
issue in the controversy. It is equally clear that 
these questions tended to seriously prejudice the 
plaintiff's case before the jury. And 'vhere the 
damage done is ineradicable, the presence of good 
faith or inadvertence is of little moment. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
• • • 
''While it is true that the objections inter-
posed to the questions complained of were sus-
tained, yet by reason of that very fact, they may 
have been, and probably were, the more prejudi-
cial to the plaintiff. * * * By objection and 
by argument, the matter was particularly called 
to the attention of the jury. The probable and, 
no doubt, logical result of improper questioning 
is to give the jury the impression that the facts 
assumed actually exist, and that the reason why 
the opposite party objects to the questions is that 
he is trying to keep such facts from the jury.'' 
In the instant situation, the objection to the initial 
question of counsel for respondents was overruled by 
the court ( Tr. 200). 
This was prejudicial error because the ruling sug-
gested that the substance of the question was proper. 
The entire line of questioning engaged by counsel for 
respondents with relation to severance damage paid by 
the State was of such a nature that their prejudicial 
effect was not erased thereafter. 
(B) Su.ch questions . were asked in bad faith and 
their prejudicial effect was not cured. 
The attempt of counsel for respondents to inject, 
into the legitimate pursuits of the trial, interrogatories 
relating to severance paid to another landowner along 
the same highway project, resulted in a denial of a fair 
and impartial trial. The train of questions, beginning at 
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Tr. 200, Line 7 and continuing to Tr. 201, Line 6, were 
pointed toward the same matter, only the phraseology 
being different. Three of the questions 'vere propounded 
by respondents' counsel after an objection thereto had 
been sustained. This venture may only be classified as 
performed in bad faith. 
The courts of this country relentlessly condemn ef-
forts of counsel to utilize the courtroom as a weapon 
against the adversary by inserting unfounded and im-
proper questions into the hearing. Louisville & N. R. 
Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S. \V. 352. Thus, it is 
announced in 39 Am. J ur. 80, New Trial, Sec. 65: 
'' lVIisconduct of counsel may consist in at-
teinpting to get before the jury matters not in 
issue and not properly matters for the considera-
tion of the jury by means of asking witnesses im-
proper questions or making improper offers of 
proof. In recent years there has been a decided 
increase in the nun1ber of cases in "rhich com-
plaint has been made of prejudice suffered by 
rPason of such misconduct, and frequently a new 
trial is sought and granted on this ground, par-
ticularly 'vhere an attorney persistently pursues 
a "Tholly unjustified and prejudicial course of 
interrogation, not,vithstanding the objections n1ade 
by counsel for the opposing party litigant and 
sustained by the court. * * * ,\ ... hile the 
granting or \vi thholding of the desired relief is 
to be determined 'vith a vie"T to the effect of the 
facts which have been brought to the jury's at-
tention, 1nany authorities hold that a ne'Y trial 
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will be ordered where it appears that counsel for 
the prevailing party solicited improper answers 
from a witness or pursued an improper and prej-
udicial course of interrogation, for example, 
where incompetent questions which assume the 
existence of damaging facts have been put with 
such persistency as to make it evident that the 
questions, and not the answers, are considered 
important. So, it will constitute ground for a new 
trial if counsel, in disregard of the court's ruling 
that a certain line of evidence is inadmissible, 
persists in attempting to get such evidence before 
the jury, to the prejudice of the unsuccessful par-
ty. As has been pointed out, in many instances 
of Inisconduct in propounding questions concern-
ing matters which counsel has no right to inquire 
into, the opposing counsel, if he makes objection, 
is necessarily placed in the false light of suppres-
sing significant evidence and attempting to de-
ceive the jury into rendering an unjust verdict. 
The good or bad faith of counsel, and the extent 
of his bad faith where it exists, are elements to 
be taken into consideration, but are not necessar-
ily controlling; good faith is not a shield to a 
litigant whose counsel seriously errs in the matter 
under consideration.'' 
See also Johns v. Shinall, 103 Colo. 381, 86 P. 2d 605 
(1939); McCrae v. McCoy, 214 S. C. 343, 52 S. E. 2d 
403; Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N. D. 708, 193 N. \V. 312. 
It is of no moment to say that, of the six questions asked 
by counsel for the respondents, the lower court sustained 
an objection to five of them. The law is "\veil settled that 
a party engaged in prejudicial examination may not 
defend against a plea for new trial on the theory that 
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the objections were sustained to his questions. Entz-
minger v. Seigler, supra; 88 C. J. S. 329, Trial, Sec. 
162 (b). It is interesting to note that counsel for respon-
dents never made any offer of proof, whatsoever, in con-
nection with the amount of severance damage allegedly 
paid to the neighbor by the State of Utah; interesting 
to note that the name of the landowner abutting the 
Christens ens' tract on the west was never mentioned by 
counsel for respondents; interesting to note that noth-
ing was said relative to the type of property for which 
the severance damage payment was allegedly made. 
Counsel's statement of $3,500 stands alone and un-
founded by fact. 
It could be well argued, and is submitted herein, that 
the jury verdict of $4,420 for severance damage reflects 
the effect of the improper examination of counsel. 
POINT III 
REFUSAL OF THE LO~~R COURT TO 
RECEIVE E'TIDENCE, ON BEHALF OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, RELATING TO 
ZONING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUB-
JECT PROPERTY AT OR ABOUT THE 
DATE OF CONDE~INATION, WAS PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR. 
Testi1nony of the respondents, brought forth during 
their case in chief, asserted that the property of the re-
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spondents, at the date of condemnation, was zoned by 
American Fork City so that the sheep business conducted 
upon the Christensen premises constituted a non-con-
forming use; and that the reason the respondents could 
not utilize the coops on the remaining property for a 
poultry operation \vas that the zoning regulations pro-
hibited such use. The State of Utah, to establish its. own 
case in connection with the value of the property before 
and after the taking, a.nd to reb'ltt the case of respon-
dents, offered to prove that the zoning ordinances of 
American Fork City at the date set for assessment of 
compensation did not forbid the application and devo-
tion of the Christensen property for the chicken busi-
ness; that, in actuality, the zoning ordinance which re-
spondents relied on was enacted and effective several 
months after January of 1960 (Tr. 175 and 222). The 
lower court sustained objections to the testimony of both 
~Ir. Harding and Mr. Stein in this regard and, in so 
doing, committed prejudicial error. The objectives, as 
explained to the lower court (Tr. 176), in introducing 
evidence concerning the ordinance passed after the date 
of condemnation, were: 
(1) To a.id in the determination of the gravity 
of severance damage. The ordinance prohibited use 
of the respondents' property for either sheep, poul-
try, or dairy operation so that the use of the re-
spondents' property for pasturing sheep was, at 
best, non-conforming. In turn, this was indicative 
of a change in the highest and best use of the prop-
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erty from a small farming operation to a residential 
plat within the municipality. 
(2) To rebut the case of respondents. The wit-
nesses for respondents, without exception, including 
the lando"'rners themselves, testified that, as of Jan-
uary 18, 1960, the ordinance restricting the use of 
the condemned tract was in effect. The fact of the 
matter refuted this testimony. 
It is submitted that this testimony should have been 
received not only for rebuttal, but also to establish the 
case of the State. Malia, et al. v. Seeley, 89 U. 262, 57 
P. 2d 357 (1936); 1 Wigmore on the Law of Evidence, 
3rd Ed., 425, Sec. 34 ;· 88 ·C.. J. S. 212, Trial, Sec. 101. 
The fact that the State "\\7as thwarted in its efforts to 
accomplish both resulted in prejudice to its interests. 
POINT nr 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT \VAS AN INCORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND CONSTI-
TUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The lo'\ver court in its instruction to the jury on de-
termination of severance damage stated: 
"Instruction No. 7 
"You are instructed that when a parcel of 
land is taken by eminent don1ain, the owner is not 
restricted to compensation for the land actually 
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taken; he is also entitled to Tecover for the dam-
age, if any, to his remaining land. These damages 
may include such items as the cutting of remain-
ing land into irregular or inconvenient shapes, 
cutting off access to a highway, annoyances frorn 
no~ise, /vibrations, dust, odors, obstruction of view, 
and lessened value of the' remainder as a site for 
the purposes for which the land was being used. 
''You are further instructed that the use of, 
accommodation for pasturing, protecting and 
keeping sheep for general purposes and for sheer-
ing and lambing in season in connection with the 
owner's sheep business op.eration, to which the 
property was being put to at the time of taking 
by the State Road Commission of Utah, are ele-
ments to be considered in fixing the damages, if 
any, to the remaining land of the defendant." 
(Emphasis Ours.) 
Instruction No. 7 is inaccurate, misleading, and a 
misstatement of the law, relating to damages compen-
sable under the laws of eminent domain. First of all, 
the second sentence of such instruction draws to the 
attention of the jury specific elements of damage and 
tends to elucidate and emphasize particular factors. An 
instruction stressing individual evidentiary rna tters is 
considered improper, for it amounts to a comment on the 
evidence by the court. Meecham, v . .Allen, 1 U. 2d 285, 
262 P. 2d 285 (1953); .Addy v. Ste-tvart, 207 P. 2d 498 
(Ida. 1949) . 
The instruction further charges the jury that it may 
consider, as severance damage, cutting off access to a 
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highway. The testimony in the case is altogether clear 
that the acquisition of the .54 acre by the State and the 
construction of the public improvement did not limit or 
restrict any access to the defendants' property, which 
he enjoyed prior to the taking. While it is true that the 
highway facility is designated as a limited access im-
provement (the freeway is a new highway), the abutting 
landowner has no right of access to it, and no compen-
sation may be awarded for tl1e restriction of access. 
City of Los J.4ngeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. App. 2d 348, 
210 P. 2d }17 (1949); Schnider v. State of Cali-
fornia, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P. 2d 1 (1952) ; State High-
tvay Department v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783 
(1954); State Highway Department v. Calkins, 50 Wash. 
2d 716, 314 P. 2d 449 (1957). 
Further evidence of error In said instruction is 
found in the second sentence thereof, for it authorizes 
the jury to consider other factors, which have no sup-
porting basis in the transcript or the testimony adduced 
at the trial. Pointedly, there was no evidence subn1itted 
by the respondents relative to the depreciation in the 
value of the remaining property, caused by vibrations 
from the public improven1ent, nor was there evidence 
indicating· that dust accumulations would lessen the 
value of the remaining tract. An instruction given, which 
does not find its basis upon testimony produced and 
received at the trial is i1nproper and prejudicial. M ehr 
v. Child, et al., 90 U. 348, 61 P. 2d 624 (1936) ; Mantonya 
v. Bratlie, et al., 33 Cal. 2d 120, 199 P. 2d 677 (1948). 
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With respect to that part of the instruction con-
cerned with the compensability for obstruction of view, 
it is submitted that the law of eminent domain in this 
jurisdiction does not recognize such, for the factor is 
aesthetic in nature, and does not affect substantive land 
values. A landowner does not have an easement of view 
across neighboring property and the State of Utah may 
construct upon the land it acquires such in1provements 
as it sees fit, without compensating the abutting property 
owner, so long as easements of air and light are not 
unreasonably restricted. (Concurring opinion in State 
Road Comm.ission v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P. 2d 
276.) 
The second sentence of Instruction No. 7 directs the 
jury that, in determining severance damage, it may con-
sider the effect of the acquisition of the State Road Com-
mission upon the owners' ~sheep business operation and 
the use of the land for shearing and lambing. The con-
clusion is manifest that said instruction relates to the 
business operation of the respondents, conducted upon 
the land prior to the filing of the complaint of the State 
of Utah, and the effect that the condemnation had upon 
business. Little time need be spent in citing authorities 
to this Court that loss of profits or prospecti¥e damages 
to a business concern are not compensable elements in 
eminent domain. State v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 
(1957). The business is distinct from the value of the 
remaining tract. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 
4, p. 255, Sec. 13.3. 
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30 
The instruction, in its entirety, was erroneous and 
the jury was allowed to consider elements not compen-
sable and not a part of the lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court, by reason of error 
committed during the trial of the matter, should be re-
versed and remanded to such court for new trial on the 
issues of compensation. 
Respectflilly submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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